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Some years ago, Judge Weinstein lamented that in the process of
overseeing the Zyprexa litigation, he never saw any of the plaintiffs.1
The Judge’s experience raises the following question: How much par-
ticipation should our procedural system offer litigants?  This question
poses a challenge because in a mass society it is too difficult to support
a civil justice system that provides every litigant with the opportunity
to speak directly to a judge about her individual case.  We live in a
world of process scarcity.2  Yet seeing the litigants in person is helpful
for a judge who wants to understand how the law affects people in real
life, and it is helpful for those subject to his rulings to see how justice
operates.
Mass cases, where tens of thousands of lawsuits are filed about the
same subject matter, lead to process scarcity for litigants.3  Such cases
put pressure on the idea that every person is entitled to the opportu-
nity to be heard at a meaningful time in a meaningful manner.4  Many
* Joel Barlow Professor of Law, University of Connecticut.  My gratitude to Stephan Lands-
man for inviting me to the Clifford Symposium and to Josh Graboff for his research assistance.
1. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  The Judge was
speaking on a panel entitled “9/11 Lessons for Mass Torts” at Benjamin A. Cardozo School of
Law on September 12, 2011.
2. See generally Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice, and Utility in a World
of Process Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1993).
3. Process scarcity is in part the result of the number of cases in relation to the amount of
resources, especially the number of judges, but also the result of the decisions those judges make
and the economics of litigation.  An increase in the number of judges and other court resources
would alleviate some process scarcity, but are not likely to solve the participation problem ad-
dressed here. See Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of Civil Procedure, 162
U. PA L. REV. 1839, 1856–76 (2014) (discussing the various explanations for the vanishing trial);
see also Chief Justice’s 1991 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan.
1992, at 1, 2 (“[A] federal judiciary rising above 1,000 members will be of lesser quality and
could be dominated by a bureaucracy of ancillary personnel.”).
4. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner.’”  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).  Our due process jurisprudence only offers the
opportunity to be heard, not a full and fair hearing.  Robert Cover noted the disconnect between
the very minimalist regime described in the Supreme Court’s due process cases and the expan-
sive process provided for in the Federal Rules.  Robert M. Cover, Foreward, For James Wm.
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 732–33 (1974).
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of these cases are transferred to districts far away from the place
where they were originally filed and are run by a plaintiffs’ manage-
ment committee.  The powerful lawyers in these cases have “inven-
tory” clients numbering in the thousands.5  It is easy to see how in
such a system the judge may never see an actual litigant in the court-
room.  These realities challenge the idea that every person is entitled
to his or her day in court because the system is not structured to offer
that experience to each and every litigant.
Even in ordinary litigation, involving one plaintiff and one defen-
dant, we might wonder to what extent the litigant, as opposed to her
lawyer, can be said to directly participate in the process.  Studies show
that many disputes are resolved by settlement mills where a lawsuit
may not even be filed.6  Under the modern procedural regime, cases
are mostly decided through dispositive pretrial motions or settle-
ment.7  There is often no oral argument, so litigants rarely have an
opportunity to come to the courtroom to hear argument on their
case.8  This is especially true in mass actions, where the lawyers seem
to be nearly autonomous and clients never appear before the court at
all.
These facts offer practical reasons not to insist on or expect signifi-
cant litigant participation, but they do not offer a normative reason.
For that, we have to ask why we value litigant participation.  Once we
understand what is valuable about participation, we can think about
what type of participation is normatively desirable even in a world of
process scarcity.
5. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financers as Monitors in Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1273, 1292 (2012); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 89
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2437853 (demonstrat-
ing that judges appoint lawyers who are repeat players to high level positions in multidistrict
litigation).
6. See generally Nora Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV.
805 (2011).  This phenomenon is an old one. See Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The
Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 1571, 1583–84 (2004) (describing early instances of settlements by matrix).
7. See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004) (documenting the
decline in trials).
8. Jordan M. Singer & William G. Young, Measuring Bench Presence: Federal District Judges
in the Courtroom, 2008–2012, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 243, 258 (2013) (stating that aggregate data
show courtroom hours are in steady decline, which means that judges are hearing fewer argu-
ments in open court); cf. Judith Resnik & Dennis Curtis, Re-Presenting Justice: Visual Narratives
of Judgment and the Invention of Democratic Courts, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 19, 83 (citing U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: BETTER COURTROOM USE DATA
COULD ENHANCE FACILITY PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING, GAO/GGD-97-39, at 2–3, 10
(1997)) (discussing the decline in the use of courtrooms).
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The American legal system values participation and continues to
pay homage to the idea of direct participation in lawsuits for two rea-
sons,9 even if it does not take concrete steps to realize this ideal in
practice.  The first reason for valuing participation is that participation
is a predicate to consent.  The idea is that results of litigation are legit-
imate—legally, morally, and especially sociologically—if the partici-
pants have consented to them.  Litigant consent requires direct
participation in the lawsuit.
A second reason for valuing participation is that it affirms a com-
mitment to public reason.  Litigation plays a role in articulating rea-
sons that are important to deliberation in a democracy.  The process
of litigation produces arguments from the plaintiffs and defendants
and reasons from the judge.  These arguments and reasons are made
public and are subject to critique from people outside the litigation.
Public reason is a contested concept, and of particular difficulty is the
line between a public and a private reason.  I do not address the ques-
tion of what ought to constitute appropriate arguments for public rea-
son in a democracy in this Article, but rather hold to a relatively
narrow view that the types of reasons publicly articulated and ac-
cepted in open court qualify as public reason.10  What is important is
that reasons are articulated and defended publicly, as opposed to
mere assertions of preference.  This idea is consistent with what Judge
Weinstein calls a “communicatarian ethics.”11
Of the two dominant reasons for valuing participation in litiga-
tion—consent and public reason—the latter offers the better norma-
tive underpinning for participation in mass litigation.  The consent
approach to litigation is a poor fit in mass cases for two reasons.  First,
it leads judges to acquiesce to a thin, nominal definition of consent
that cannot justify the results in mass cases.  Second, it promotes an
orientation towards private, individual resolutions in cases that are
fundamentally collective and have broad social effects.  The public
reason rationale for valuing participation in litigation is a better fit for
the best practices in mass tort litigation, and is more likely to lead to
innovative procedures that promote greater litigant participation.
Judge Weinstein has pioneered specific procedural tools that are con-
sistent with the public reason rationale for participation.  Procedural
9. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (affirming the importance of the day in court
ideal).
10. Philosophers are more precise.  For a discussion of what reasons ought to count as public
reasons, with a particular focus on John Rawls’ theory, see Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal
Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449 (2006).
11. JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION:  THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 46–52 (1995).
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innovations that promote public reason should be more widely
adopted.
II. CONSENT AND PUBLIC REASON
The idea of participation based on consent is epitomized by a settle-
ment agreement, a consent decree, or an opt-in class action.  Public
reason is epitomized by a trial, oral argument on a dispositive motion,
the certification of a class action, or perhaps a fairness hearing in a
class action settlement.  These two approaches to participation corre-
late with two dominant ideas about the purpose of adjudication: dis-
pute resolution and law declaration.
Before moving to the definition of consent and public reason ratio-
nales for participation in litigation, it is important to recognize that
the two constructs are not mutually exclusive, just as the dispute reso-
lution and law declaration models of adjudication are not mutually
exclusive.  Nevertheless, treating consent and public reason separately
is helpful for understanding the values driving the debate about
participation.
The consent rationale is based on the dispute resolution model of
litigation.  The idea that one ought to be able to participate in the
resolution of one’s own dispute, the most familiar rationale for partici-
pation, is grounded in recognition of individual autonomy.  If the pur-
pose of litigation is to resolve cases, it is important that litigants accept
that resolution.  Obtaining participants’ consent to the process is one
way to gain acceptance of the outcome, even if that outcome is unfa-
vorable.  Adherents to the dispute resolution model prefer the liti-
gants to resolve their dispute through negotiation and settlement
methods.  As Justice Harlan explained, “[P]rivate structuring of indi-
vidual relationships and repair of their breach is largely encouraged in
American life, subject only to the caveat that the formal judicial pro-
cess, if resorted to, is paramount.”12
Under the dispute resolution model, settlement is the most efficient
way to resolve disputes and has legitimacy because it is predicated on
litigant consent.  The rules that permit parties to waive many due pro-
cess protections, such as personal jurisdiction and their Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, similarly focus on litigant consent to
the dispute resolution process.13  The rights to a jury trial and to vari-
ous due process protections allow litigants to participate in their law-
12. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 375 (1971).
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h); see also, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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suits.  Because litigants can waive these rights, participation can be
understood as mostly a matter of consent.
By contrast, the public reason rationale for participation correlates
with the law articulation model of litigation.  Under this model, as
Owen Fiss wrote, “[a]djudication is the social process by which judges
give meaning to our public values.”14  Similarly, Lon Fuller wrote that
adjudication is “a device which gives formal and institutional expres-
sion to the influence of reasoned argument in human affairs.”15  Fuller
contrasted adjudication, with its “higher responsibility toward ration-
ality,” to contracting and voting.16  Whereas a participant need not
give a reason for her decision when entering into a contract or casting
a ballot, adjudication is based on the presentation of proofs and rea-
sons in favor of or against an outcome.  The particular form of partici-
pation that characterizes litigation—presentation of proofs and
reasoned argument—encourages deliberation and critical engagement
with the underlying justification for a decision, at least in its best in-
carnation.17  The idea is rooted in deliberative democratic theory.  In
order for decisions to be politically legitimate, the reasons justifying
the decisions must be made public.18  Under the law articulation
model, settlements are suspect even though the parties have con-
14. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
15. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 366 (1978).
16. Id. at 367.  There was much more than this to the theory Fuller proposed in his classic
article, but I want to focus on the presentation of proofs and reasoned argument as an expression
of public reason here.  Fuller focused a great deal of effort on distinguishing between the types
of cases for which judicial action is appropriate and those for which it is not.  That debate is an
important one still, but my focus is not on the question of what types of disputes are appropri-
ately decided by courts, but on the question of participation once a dispute is in the court system.
Particularly relevant here is Fuller’s description of adjudication as a special kind of participation
in social ordering, which affirms a commitment to reasoned argument. See generally Fuller,
supra note 15.  For a recent iteration of the debate about the limits of adjudication in solving
complex social problems, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct.
1910 (2011).
17. This Article draws on the literature about the role of education, communication, and de-
liberation on the polity. See, e.g., HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 192–212 (1958)
(discussing the role of democracy in fostering communication regarding issues that shape social
life); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 45 (1996)
(“Many constitutional democrats focus on the importance of extensive moral deliberation within
one of our democratic institutions—the Supreme Court.  They argue that judges cannot interpret
constitutional principles without engaging in deliberation, not least for the purpose of construct-
ing a coherent view out of the many moral values that our constitutional tradition expresses.”
(footnote omitted)). See generally HUGH BAXTER, HABERMAS: THE DISCOURSE THEORY OF
LAW AND DEMOCRACY (2011).
18. HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING ABOUT THE
ENDS OF POLICY (2003). See generally Joshua Cohen, An Epistemic Conception of Democracy,
97 ETHICS 26 (1986); GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 17, at 95–127.
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sented, because settlements do not provide a justification of the out-
come available for public review and criticism.19
A critic might respond that the description of adjudication as gov-
erned by reason through arguments and responses to those arguments
is inaccurate because adjudicators do not always provide reasons for
their decisions.  Judges’ rulings are not always accompanied by written
opinions explaining their reasoning.20  The Supreme Court, an institu-
tion singled out by some theorists as an exemplar of public reason,
routinely denies petitions for certiorari without explaining its reasons
for denial.21  Even when courts give reasons, these reasons may not be
very rigorous or satisfying, and may even be insincere.22  The fact that
our system tolerates an absence of reasons or poor reasons indicates
that we do not value reasons very much—or so the argument goes.
Yet instances when judges fail to give reasons are the exception, not
the rule.  Most of the time, we expect judges to give reasons.  Further-
more, pointing to instances of judges failing to give reasons does not
make it normatively desirable not to give reasons.  If judges were not
giving reasons most of the time, it might be necessary to consider why
we are willing to tolerate a regime that decides cases without reasons.
But because we have a regime that requires reasons most of the time,
we need not consider that hypothetical.
The jury presents a harder case.  Jury deliberations are conducted in
a “black box.”  Even when they fill out verdict forms, jurors are not
required to state the reasons for their findings.  In a jury trial, reasons
are developed through the presentation of proofs and arguments to
the jury and there is a further expectation that the jury will engage in
19. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–90 (1984).
20. See Maya Sen, Courting Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative Democracy in the Ameri-
can Judicial System, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 303 (2013) (arguing that “con-
tributions both from social sciences and from doctrinal scholarship suggest that judges are
strategic (and oftentimes political) actors, and that their ‘deliberations’ might be more similar to
quid pro quo bargaining than to reasoned intellectual exchanges”); see also Mathilde Cohen,
Because I Said So: The Federal Courts’ Ipse Dixit Problem (Sept. 23, 2011) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author).
21. For a description of the Court as an exemplar of public reason, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITI-
CAL LIBERALISM 231–40 (1996).  The Court also avoids some questions that would require it to
give reasons, and confronts other questions it might avoid. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Essay,
On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 665 (2012).
22. See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers
Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091 (2010).  An example of this is the Supreme Court’s recent plead-
ings jurisprudence, which requires that a litigant assert facts in support of her complaint even
when it is clear that she will be unable to do so absent discovery. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009).  Fifty years ago, Judge Weinstein criticized the types of categories that litigants
currently struggle with under the new pleadings regime.  Jack B. Weinstein & Daniel H. Distler,
Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518, 520–21
(1957).
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serious deliberation about those proofs and arguments.23  Special ver-
dict forms may ask for the factual predicate of the jury’s findings, but
this is not the same as a reasoned opinion.  In theory, judges could ask
for publicly stated reasons from the jury, and the fact that we accept
jury verdicts as legitimate, although they do not provide reasons, dem-
onstrates that the idea that participation in adjudication requires pub-
lic reason giving is not universal.  Conversely, the lack of reasons
accompanying jury verdicts may be one reason why there is so much
criticism of the civil jury.
Sometimes the problem is not that there are no reasons, as dis-
cussed above, but that the reasons are not good enough.  The objec-
tion that the reasons are not good reasons, or good enough reasons,
presents the least of the problems for adjudication because the pro-
cess of articulating a reason begins a dialogue about the validity and
strength of that reason, which is the essence of the enterprise.  The
fact that adjudication is based on reasoned arguments does not guar-
antee that the reasons given will be good ones.  Good reasons require
further criteria for evaluation.  But to engage at the level of proofs
and reasoning is a fundamental step that creates a basis for critiquing
reasons and suggesting better reasons in support of alternative out-
comes.  A judge’s failure to give a reason for her decision is a far more
serious problem.24
Some argue that the process of litigation obscures reasons rather
than elucidates them.  This is especially true for people not acclimated
to the court system.  To them, the types of reasons presented by law-
yers and accepted by judges may seem beside the point to the problem
at hand.  The reasons that lawyers provide to the court and that judges
accept do not always fit with the common sense of ordinary people,
nor do these reasons always do justice to the narratives that give rise
to disputes.25
Furthermore, members of a pluralist society such as our own have
difficulty agreeing on which reasons are good reasons.26  The process
23. Studies show that jurors do take deliberation seriously. See generally Shari Seidman Dia-
mond et al., The “Kettleful of Law” in Real Jury Deliberations: Successes, Failures, and Next
Steps, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1537 (2012) (discussing a study of real jury deliberations in Arizona
state courts to demonstrate that jurors take jury instructions and the deliberation process
seriously).
24. See, e.g., Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519–20 (2011) (describing a contempt pro-
ceeding in which the judge neglected to apply the governing law to the case at hand).
25. See generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SIBLEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW (1998).
26. See generally DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE PO-
LITICAL (Selya Benhabib ed., 1996) (presenting essays on the theme of the challenges of pluralist
democracy).
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of reason giving, without more, does not help us evaluate the quality
of reasons.  For example, imagine there is a case that requires the
court to balance two competing values.  The process of reason giving
does not dictate which value should be given precedence.  Adjudica-
tion gives us a process for presenting reasons, but even if that process
is entirely satisfactory, more is needed to determine which reasons to
choose.  This is an argument in favor of adjudication as a process of
participation through presentation of reasoned proofs rather than
against it.  It is true that we have trouble agreeing on which reasons
are good, and that these arguments are often arguments regarding
fundamental values about which people can reasonably differ.  This is
at least one reason that process-based theories have had such staying
power in American legal thought.27  Adjudication is a process for
making reasoned arguments even if that process does not dictate the
values that will ultimately determine which reason is the right reason
or the best one.
A final argument against the public reason rationale for participa-
tion in litigation is that people are fundamentally irrational, and rea-
son plays a smaller role in decision making than many assume.28
Irrationality may be a fact of human decision making, but this does
not mean that we are incapable of recognizing reasons, debating them,
and trying to reach the best possible decision.  That the process of
presenting proofs and arguments on the side of the litigants, and eval-
uating them on the side of the judge, is an imperfect one is not a suffi-
cient basis for giving up on public reason and its corollary, self-
government.
27. See Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 703–05 (1993) (challenging the intellectual history of a discrete “legal
process” school and arguing that the legal process tradition “must be understood primarily as the
embodiment of an attitude concerning the importance of rationality within a democracy” and
that “faith in reason lies at the heart of American legal culture,” even if that faith is contested by
competing schools of thought).  For a critique of legal process approaches, see generally Law-
rence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063 (1980).
28. See, e.g., DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE
OUR DECISIONS (rev. ed. 2009); DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2012)
(describing studies showing that the use of heuristics in fast thinking can obscure truth); Dan
Kahan et al., Cognitive Bias and the Constitution of the Liberal Republic of Science (Yale Law
School, Public Law Working Paper No. 270, Nov. 11, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2174032 (describing studies showing that large groups are more likely to make ideologically
driven interpretations of data).
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III. UNDERSTANDING PARTICIPATION THROUGH
PRECLUSION DOCTRINE
One window on the judicial understanding of participation as a
value in litigation is preclusion doctrine.  Preclusion is the other side
of participation.  Under the general principles of preclusion, only a
person who has been a party to the litigation (that is, who has had the
opportunity to be heard) may be bound by that suit.  Plaintiffs who
seem virtually identical and who bring the same claim must each be
given the opportunity to litigate her own lawsuit independently.29
The exceptions to this general rule underscore the dominant con-
sent rationale of participation.  For example, litigants may be bound
by a prior judgment although they did not have a “full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate” their lawsuit (1) by agreement of the parties; (2)
when they exercised control over the first litigation; or (3) when they
attempt to litigate by proxy, using their agent as a plaintiff in the sec-
ond suit.30  In each of these exceptions, it is the litigant’s consent that
determines whether she will be bound.  Similarly, the historical ante-
cedents of preclusion based on a legal relationship (such as that be-
tween heirs and assigns of property) are based on the idea that
because the assign lacked control over the property, she was not enti-
tled to participation.31  In other words, the courts believed that there
was no autonomy interest to protect.  Consent was not an issue be-
cause there was no loss of rights that triggered a need for it.
A different rationale is needed in the case of preclusion in the con-
text of representative litigation such as class actions.  In the class ac-
tion context, the litigants do not expressly consent: absent class
members may be bound so long as they are adequately represented.32
Some might argue that class members impliedly consent by not opting
out.  This argument is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts,33 which made the right to opt out in
money damages class actions a due process requirement.34  The failure
to opt out may be described as consent as a formal matter, but as a
practical matter, implied consent, especially in cases where damages
29. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 885 (2008) (rejecting the doctrine of virtual
representation).
30. Id. at 892–94 (listing recognized reasons to preclude).
31. See Robert G. Bone, Rethinking “The Day in Court” Ideal and Non-Party Preclusion, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 210–11 (1992) (discussing eighteenth- and nineteenth-century cases involv-
ing preclusion of nonparties in property matters).
32. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 896.
33. 427 U.S. 797 (1985).
34. Id. at 812.
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are small, is widely recognized as a fiction.35  Injunctive and limited
fund class actions are inconsistent with the consent rationale even as a
formal matter because absent class members cannot opt out and so
they signal no implied consent by remaining in the litigation.36
The participation problem in mandatory class actions, and to some
extent in money damages class actions, is solved through interest rep-
resentation.  Individual class members do not need to participate in
the litigation because their interests are adequately represented by
others.  When the courts find that those interests are not adequately
represented, the previous lawsuit cannot preclude the class member.37
The idea of interest representation is more consistent with the pub-
lic reason rationale than with the consent rationale for participation.
Interest representation relies on the class representative to make the
best arguments in favor of the class because she shares similar inter-
ests to the absent class members.  At the class certification stage, the
judge determines that the representative is adequate in order to justify
applying the result of this lawsuit to absentees.38
Consider the attempt to settle a mass of asbestos lawsuits in
Amchem Products v. Windsor.39  Reviewing the settlement, the Su-
preme Court expressed concern about future claimants who were not
represented or inadequately represented in that settlement.40  The
problem was not that the future claimants were not able to individu-
ally or collectively consent, or that they could not appear in court.41
The Court recognized that future claimants could be bound if they
had separate class representatives who agreed to the settlement on
their behalf, but held that the future claimants needed separate repre-
sentation because their interests conflicted with those of present
claimants.42  The future claimants lacked an adequate representative
who could protect their interests and, as a result, their treatment in
35. In a very influential article, Professor Coffee argued that the class action is directed by
entrepreneurial lawyers rather than class representatives, so lawmakers should focus on creating
incentives to align the lawyers’ interests with those of the class.  John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regula-
tion of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1987); see also Alexandra D. Lahav, Fundamental Principles for Class
Action Governance, 37 IND. L. REV. 65, 79–89 (2004) (discussing the limits of claimant participa-
tion in class actions).
36. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) (providing rules for injunctive class actions).
37. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940).
38. Id. at 42.
39. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
40. Id. at 597.
41. Id. at 626–27.
42. Id.
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the settlement was not justified.43  In the Court’s view, future claim-
ants received unfair treatment in the settlement because of structural
conflicts of interest.44  The dissent’s support of the settlement similarly
relied on ideas of public reason—the justification for the settlement in
light of the alternative of long waits and costly suits—rather than an
argument about absent class member consent, express or implied.45
IV. PERCEPTIONS OF PARTICIPATION: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT
WHAT LITIGANTS WANT
The public reason approach could have found expression in the
mass tort class action, but Amchem heralded the end of such class
actions for the most part.  The doctrine in mass torts, instead, favors
the consent rationale for participation:  each plaintiff must individu-
ally consent to a settlement.  While legal doctrine does not support a
pure public-reason approach to participation, some support can be
found in psychological and sociological studies of litigant satisfaction.
These studies indicate that while litigants want to participate individu-
ally in their suit, consenting to a settlement does not necessarily satisfy
them.  Litigants seek the experience of reason giving and information
exchange that litigating a case to trial offers.
Psychological studies show that litigants are more likely to think
procedures are fair when they have an opportunity to present proofs
and arguments as part of the proceedings.46  One study found that
litigants prefer more formal proceedings such as trial, mediation, and
arbitration over resolution by settlement. In these proceedings, they
had an opportunity to tell their story, as opposed to informal settle-
ment talks where they were not present.  Litigants’ preference for in-
person dialogue held even when the judge is involved in the settle-
ment discussion.47  These findings are supported by a study of the par-
ticipants in the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund (VCF).48  Reflecting
on their choice to receive a settlement from the fund, rather than sue,
43. Id.; see also Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 257–59 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding
a collateral attack to the Agent Orange class action settlement on the grounds that the future
claimant was not adequately represented at the time of the settlement).
44. Id.
45. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 631 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
46. See generally JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHO-
LOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975).  For an update summarizing the large procedural justice literature
and empirical findings since 1975, see Nourit Zimmerman & Tom R. Tyler, Between Access to
Counsel and Access to Justice: A Psychological Perspective, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 473 (2010).
47. E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of Their Exper-
iences in the Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 953, 976 (1990).
48. Gillian K. Hadfield, Framing the Choice Between Cash and the Courthouse: Experiences
with the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 645 (2008).
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many claimants from the fund expressed mixed feelings or regret at
not having a public formal proceeding in which the airline industry
was called to account.49
The VCF study demonstrates that although people recognize the
value of  presentation of proofs and arguments and the articulation of
reasons for the decision by the court (what I am calling public reason),
they still want direct participation.  Some victim’s families did file law-
suits and did not participate in the VCF, but the fact that lawsuits
were pursued by others did not seem to assuage the regrets of the
many who chose the fund over litigation.  Public reason exercised by
others was not a replacement for individual engagement with the legal
system.  This might be because no trial was held and no public ac-
counting was had; all the plaintiffs who chose to sue settled.50  Had
there been a trial, perhaps those who had not sued would be satisfied.
But it is also possible that individual direct participation is linked so
tightly with the idea of the “day in court” that public reason without
direct, individualized participation can never be sufficient.  After all,
the VCF claimants were not completely satisfied with the public hear-
ings and report of the 9/11 Commission, although these hearings pub-
licly exposed the same information and spurred a national dialogue
about the same thing that would have been the subject of an individ-
ual lawsuit.  Although the special master of the VCF, Kenneth Fein-
berg, spent a great deal of time listening to claimants, these meetings
were not public, and ultimately the reasons for his individual decisions
with respect to each claimant are not public.  As a result, it is not
possible to call the VCF settlement a process of public reason like that
practiced by the courts.51
V. PUBLIC REASON IN MASS CASES
Several arguments militate in favor of increasing reasoned dialogue
in the mass tort context. As Judge Weinstein pointed out,
Dialogue may lead to more satisfying solutions because many of
those affected will have played some role in the process.  The felt
needs and reasoning of those directly concerned may provide in-
sights otherwise overlooked.  Dialogue also increases the sense of
49. Id. at 645–82.
50. Benjamin Weiser, Family and United Airlines Settle Last 9/11 Wrongful-Death Lawsuit,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2011, at A28.
51. However, the process was more inclusive and gave individuals more agency than the set-
tlement talks held without litigants present described in Lind et al., supra note 47, which litigants
found unsatisfactory.
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dignity of the participating person as an important entity, one who
counts and will be heard.52
Judge Weinstein’s defense of dialogue in mass cases rests on sociologi-
cal, utilitarian, and dignitary grounds.  The argument that dialogue
may lead to more satisfying solutions sounds in sociological legiti-
macy.  The idea that dialogue will provide insights that might other-
wise be overlooked may be understood as utilitarian—by considering
all arguments, the most accurate result will be reached—or as onto-
logical, promoting autonomy and dignity values.  Finally, Judge Wein-
stein presents dignity as an independent value fostered by
participation.
If it is impossible for every voice to be heard when aggregated cases
number in the thousands, how is the idea of participation through
public reason to be realized?  We must first consider the barriers pro-
cedural innovators face before turning to the question of how proce-
dural innovation can provide forms of participation grounded in the
ideal of public reason.
A. The Legal Landscape of Mass Claims
One of the most significant challenges to court administration today
is the continued influx of mass cases.  The busy docket of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) provides evidence of the ex-
tent of the problem.  In a variety of cases, from products liability to
antitrust to securities, between forty and eighty MDL transfers are
ordered every year.53  Each of these transfers can represent hundreds
or thousands of cases.  This is also a subject area in which Judge Wein-
stein’s doctrinal innovations and legal theory have been particularly
influential.
The most challenging mass cases are products liability suits.  It is
very difficult to resolve these cases through a class action settlement
that would bind all the plaintiffs because oftentimes the plaintiffs can-
not meet the class action requirement that common issues
predominate over individual ones.54  Tort law’s requirements of spe-
cific causation and proof of injury depend on individual determina-
tions, and courts often find that these individual questions
52. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 47 (footnotes omitted).
53. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS OF THE JUDI-
CIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 1–3 (2014), available at http://www.jpml.uscourts
.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2014_0.pdf.
54. I would have said impossible but for the In re Deepwater Horizon litigation, in which a
settlement class action of economic damages claims and medical benefits claims arising out of
the massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 was approved. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739
F.3d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 2014) (approving an economic damages settlement over objections).
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predominate over the common issues regarding the product.  Differ-
ences in state laws may also defeat the predominance requirement for
certifying a money damages class.55  If future claimants are included in
a mass tort class action, they must be adequately represented, and
chances are they will be able to relitigate adequacy in a collateral pro-
ceeding.56  Accordingly, a class action resolution is difficult to achieve.
Lawyers also find it difficult to resolve mass tort cases through indi-
vidual settlements collected on a wholesale basis unless only a few
firms represent most of the plaintiffs.  The main reason for this is that
defendants use mass settlement to obtain global peace, and to achieve
this goal, they need a negotiating partner who can bring significant
numbers of plaintiffs into the settlement.57  Several factors can stand
in the way of global peace.  Plaintiffs with high-value cases may opt
out of the settlement, leaving the defendant with a large settlement
that includes only low-value claims.  Or a settlement announcement
may induce new plaintiffs to file lawsuits not included in the aggregate
agreement, increasing the defendant’s exposure.58  Global peace is not
only difficult to obtain, but may result in unfairness.  Lawyers may
unfairly allocate the award by reducing the amount paid to some
plaintiffs in order to induce others to join the settlement by paying
them more.59  The risk that lawyers will allocate settlement funds un-
55. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 796–97 (2013)
(“Numerous courts hold that when the laws of multiple states are involved and are not uniform,
class certification is essentially per se inappropriate.”). But see Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc.,
667 F.3d 273, 308–09 (3d Cir. 2011) (approving certification of the settlement class despite choice
of law issues).
56. Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Henry Paul
Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1182, 1196 (1998).
57. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 265, 267–88 (2011).  As Erichson and Zipursky explain:
If too many claimants decide not to participate, the defendant faces substantial ongoing
liability exposure and litigation expenses.  Defendants worry that the claimants with the
most serious claims may be the least inclined to settle.  The last thing a defendant wants
to do is put serious money on the table only to find that the settlement eliminated junk
claims while leaving high-value plaintiffs in the litigation pipeline.  Aggregate settle-
ments can and often do resolve large bundles of mass tort claims, but when numerous
law firms each represent numerous plaintiffs, true closure is hard to find.
Id. at 267–68.
58. See Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L.
REV. 1361, 1383–84 (2005) (describing elasticity in mass torts).
59. For a discussion of the ethical issues, see Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Law-
yers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985 (2011); and Charles Silver
& Lynn Baker, I Cut, You Choose: The Role of Plaintiffs’ Counsel in Allocating Settlement Pro-
ceeds, 84 VA. L. REV. 1465 (1998).
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fairly between their inventory clients runs especially high when the
defendant conditions settlement on global peace.60
B. Solutions to the Problem of Participation in Mass Litigation
Several changes to the procedures for resolving mass litigation have
surfaced in recent years.  The American Law Institute (ALI) has pro-
posed a kind of majority-vote rule that would allow litigants to vote
on whether to accept a settlement.  This proposal rests on the consent
rationale.  By contrast, Judge Weinstein has developed several innova-
tive approaches that lean more towards the value of public reason,
such as the quasi class action and the use of advisory juries.  A discus-
sion of these different approaches to the problems of mass litigation,
and their significance for the normative question of participation and
legitimacy, follows.
1. The ALI Voting Proposal
One proposal for resolving mass actions through settlement is to
permit lawyers to ask clients to agree in advance to any settlement
which is approved by a majority or supermajority of plaintiffs.  The
ALI has propounded such a voting proposal, permitting lawyers to
obtain client consent in advance and making a settlement binding on
all clients by a supermajority vote.61  At the moment, this approach
violates the ethics rules of all fifty states.62  The main reason for this is
an ethics rule that requires a lawyer who represents multiple clients in
one proceeding to provide full disclosure of the terms of a settlement
to each client prior to asking for written consent to an aggregate
settlement.63
The current rule requiring individual consent and the settlement-by-
vote proposal represent steps along a continuum from consent to pub-
lic reason.  The rule against aggregate settlement by vote rests on a
consent rationale.  It is a well-established principle that the decision
60. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 61–66.
61. A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 3.17 (2010) [hereinafter
AGGREGATE LITIGATION]; see also Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, The Aggregate Settlement
Rule and Ideals of Client Service, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 227, 228–40 (1999); Silver & Baker, supra
note 59, at 1500–06; Charles Silver & Lynn A. Baker, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settle-
ment Rule, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (1997).
62. See, e.g., Tax Authority, Inc. v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (2014); ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsi-
bility, Formal Op. 06-438 (2006); AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 61, § 3.17 cmt. b(1)
(2010).
63. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g) (2014).
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whether or not to settle a case belongs to the client, not the lawyer.64
In ordinary lawsuits, the client is the only one empowered to accept a
settlement offer and the model is one of express consent.65  The pro-
posal that clients agree by vote is one step removed from the consent
rationale in that it shifts the point in time of the decision to consent.
Some clients may not consent once they learn the content of the set-
tlement, but they will nevertheless be bound by the settlement agree-
ment if the supermajority approves it.  As described, this proposal is
not an expression of the ideal of public reason because the client dis-
cussions are individualized and presumably private, protected by the
attorney–client privilege.  The discussions will, one hopes, include rea-
sons to accept (or to decline) the settlement.  But unlike litigation,
those reasons are not likely to be made public or presented to the
court.  The ALI voting proposal also includes a provision allowing ju-
dicial review of settlements if individuals choose to appeal to the
court.66  This aspect of the proposal is one step closer to public reason,
but only if plaintiffs take advantage of it .67
2. Judicial Solutions Sounding in Public Reason
Judicial intervention in mass settlements has been the most interest-
ing development in this area of the law in the last ten years.  One
innovation was Judge Weinstein’s response to the Zyprexa litigation,
discussed at the beginning of this Article.68  In that litigation, recall,
the judge complained that he had not seen a single plaintiff—just their
lawyers.  In response, he decided that judicial intervention was needed
to oversee the lawyers.  He called this innovation a “quasi class ac-
tion.”  That term describes a mass aggregation of lawsuits that are set-
tled all together as though they were a class action but cannot be
certified as a class action because they do not met the criteria of the
class action rule.69 Judge Weinstein observed that because these cases
have some features of class actions, including that they raise concerns
64. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (2014).
65. Id. This is also true of the aggregate settlement rule, which requires individual consent.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(g); see also supra notes 62–63 and accompanying
text; cf. Nancy J. Moore, Ethical Issues in Mass Tort Plaintiffs’ Representation: Beyond the Ag-
gregate Settlement Rule, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3233 (2013) (discussing the relationship between
the ALI proposal and the aggregate settlement rule).
66. AGGREGATE LITIGATION, supra note 61, § 3.18.
67. There are structural reasons why plaintiffs are unlikely to file such challenges, such as the
fear of losing their lawyer, for example.  Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 57, at 266.
68. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 433 F. Supp. 2d 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
69. Id. at 271.
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of authentic client consent and attorney overreaching, judicial over-
sight is appropriate.  Other judges have followed suit.70
A second innovation championed by Judge Weinstein is the use of
advisory juries.  While not exclusively the province of mass litigation
(Judge Weinstein initially advocated the use of an advisory jury in sen-
tencing), the advisory jury can be an important part of large-scale liti-
gation because of its capacity to promote reason giving to citizens
serving as lay adjudicators.
a. Quasi Class Actions
Creating a new common law doctrine by adding the prefix “quasi”
to an older, related doctrine is a classic response to the breakdown of
doctrinal categories by building a bridge between them.71  Judge
Weinstein observed the breakdown of the class action as a unitary
concept.  Instead of either being certified as a class action and re-
solved collectively or being litigated on an individual basis, cases were
being resolved collectively without the procedural protections of the
class action.72  This development creates potential conflicts of interest
between clients represented by the same lawyer and between the cli-
ents and the lawyer.  The judiciary’s decision to consolidate large
numbers of similar cases in one venue (to the extent consistent with
federalism) makes this phenomenon of collective, nonclass resolution
possible.  Accordingly, judicial involvement is both necessary and war-
ranted, and in any event, has become standard in such cases.
By naming the quasi class action and asserting judicial input into the
mass settlement made possible by judicial intervention and shepherd-
ing, Judge Weinstein illuminated the importance of public reason in
the resolution of litigation.  The advent of quasi class action settle-
ments has caused concern among critics who worry that plaintiffs are
70. Another example of this trend is Judge Hellerstein’s decision in the 9/11 First Responders
Litigation to hold a fairness hearing even though the case was not certified as a class action.  For
a discussion of that decision, see Howard M. Erichson, Commentary, The Role of the Judge in
Non-Class Settlements, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1015 (2013).
71. Other examples include quasi in rem in personal jurisdiction doctrine or quasi-contract.
Quasi in rem, forever emblazoned on the memory of every first year law student from the canon-
ical case Pennoyer v. Neff, involved the breakdown of jurisdictional categories in personam and
in rem. See 95 U.S. 714, 724 (1877).  In that case, the reader hardly needs reminding, a litigant
attempted to obtain jurisdiction to enforce a contract for services in reliance on the existence of
property within the jurisdiction. Id. at 719–20.  This attempt fit neither the extant legal category
of in personam—which required personal service—nor in rem, which covered suits about the
property itself even when the owner was outside the jurisdiction. Id. at 736–37 (Hunt, J., dissent-
ing).  The doctrine of quasi in rem bridged these categories.
72. These include the right to judicial approval of the settlement, a fairness hearing before
that approval, and the right to object to the settlement or to opt out of the proceeding. FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(e).
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denied control over their own decision making.73  These concerns
have focused on the proposal that plaintiffs be permitted to bind
themselves to a settlement agreement by a majority vote.  But critics
have also argued against judicial intervention on the grounds that ju-
dicial review of mass settlements deprives plaintiffs of control over
their own case if the judge rejects the settlement and inoculates law-
yers against charges of malfeasance if the judge approves it.74
The core case against judicial review of mass settlements rests on
the idea of consent.  But the choice in mass cases need not be between
consent and closure, as two prominent academics have described it.75
Instead, the quasi class action can be understood as a judicial attempt
to instill the value of public reason into a dynamic created by court-
ordered procedures that cannot reliably be expected to produce au-
thentic consent.  This is not to concede that consent is the only valid
rationale for participation, or that public reason is a concept only im-
portant where authentic consent is not possible.  Public reason is an
equally valid way to achieve collective participation where authentic
consent is not possible.
Those who believe that the purpose of litigation is dispute resolu-
tion and that the measure of participation is consent do not approve
of judicial involvement in mass settlement.76  But for those who recog-
nize that the purpose of litigation is also the articulation of law and
the just resolution of legal disputes, public reason is a corollary to
those values.  Judicial involvement is a welcome development from
the public reason point of view because it promotes the reasoned ar-
ticulation of arguments in favor of (and against) a particular collective
resolution.
The best argument against judicial intervention in mass settlements,
even from a public reason perspective, sounds in separation of pow-
ers.  Martha Minow has suggested that the resolution of mass cases
through large-scale settlement constitutes the creation of temporary
administrative agencies and asked whether this poses a separation of
powers issue: “Has the court strayed into the domain of the executive
to enforce the law or taken over the task of the legislature to devise
prospective rules and establish governmental agencies?”77  She de-
73. See, e.g., Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 57, at 313, 317 (arguing that a voting mechanism
for resolution of mass cases ignores plaintiffs’ autonomy as rights holders, and that the proper
role of tort law is protecting the rights of the individual).
74. Erichson, supra note 70, at 1024.
75. Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 57, at 311, 320–21.
76. See generally Erichson, supra note 70 (arguing against judicial involvement).
77. Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary Ad-
ministrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2022 (1997).
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fended Judge Weinstein’s pioneering work in mass settlement on three
grounds.  First, judges in cases such as mass torts act in the vacuum
left by the elected branches, potentially spurring dialogue between the
branches regarding the best solution to social problems such as mass
torts.78  Judge Weinstein has explained that the judge’s role “is a stop-
gap in the absence of legislative action.”79  The judge in a mass action
can serve as a voice of the community as a whole, or at least attempt
to enable fruitful dialogue about social issues that is not possible in a
cacophony of individual voices.80  Second, Minow points out that judi-
cial action in mass torts is more like other forms of adjudication than
critics allow.81  It has long been the province of the judiciary to regu-
late the conduct of lawyers before the court and to raise issues of jus-
tice and fairness even when the litigants do not.82  Third, Minow
argues that “exposure and defense of the boundaries between the
branches are necessary for reasoned debate” and that innovative judi-
cial action can make concrete a vision of the relationship between law
and justice that can start that debate.83
Returning to the central claim of this Article, it is possible to create
an opportunity for a full and fair hearing of the stakeholders in a liti-
gation (including the plaintiffs) and to obtain an official statement
from a government official (i.e., the judge) as to the propriety of that
settlement.  The focus of that hearing cannot be individual consent,
because it is clear that consent will be inauthentic.  Instead, the focus
ought to be the articulation of reasons, made public and challenged.
One avenue for this public dialogue is the quasi class action.  Critics
who accept the public reason approach to participation may still ask
whether we can trust the judge to say whether a settlement is fair.
This important question continues to plague class actions.  Yet, the
best protection we have against judicial acquiescence to poor settle-
ments is public reason, testing arguments against one another, and
presenting proofs in support of those arguments.84  Judges ought to
78. Id. at 2023; see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLU-
SION, AND AMERICAN LAW 356–72 (1990) (discussing a dialogic conception of separation of
powers).
79. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 104.
80. “When so many discordant voices are heard and so much money is at stake, a hand with
no financial interest in the outcome is necessary to impose order and discipline and avoid
chaos.” Id. at 102.
81. Minow, supra note 77, at 2024.
82. See generally Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L.J. 447 (2009) (discussing
the limits on the ability to judges to raise issues sua sponte).
83. Minow, supra note 77, at 2024–25.
84. Cf. Lahav, supra note 35 (arguing in favor of “devil’s advocates” and other procedures to
increase the adversarial nature of fairness hearings).
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explain why the requirements of Rule 23 are met and why a settle-
ment is fair to the participants, recognizing that plaintiffs’ ability to
consent to the settlement is limited by features of modern legal prac-
tice that are beyond their control.
What makes the consent rationale a poor fit in the mass tort context
is the entrenched practice of aggregating cases informally by lawyers
in the first instance and in the courts after filing, in order to make
litigation economical.  The conflicts of interest between clients, and
between lawyers and clients, that result from this aggregation further
limit consent.  Aggregation also means that the litigation is larger and
its mechanisms more far reaching than in any individual lawsuit.  This
is not to say that judges should forget about the individual within the
aggregate, but rather that the ideal of authentic individual consent and
total autonomy in decision making by each plaintiff in the mass tort
context is inconsistent with lived reality.85  Understanding litigation
exclusively as a means for resolving disputes, the basis for the consent
rationale, does not capture the modern function of litigation which
reaches beyond the individual controversy.86  Judge Weinstein ob-
served: “As a general rule, the need for more intense court interven-
tion is in inverse proportion to the effectiveness of the community in
dealing with disasters.”87  The set of circumstances that gives rise to
mass actions is often a systemic course of conduct towards many peo-
ple and involving the failures of a number of institutions.  In other
words, it is a type of social problem that comes before the court as a
set of lawsuits.
b. Advisory Juries
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a court to try any issue
with an advisory jury on its own without party consent, although party
consent is required if the jury verdict is to have the same effect as a
jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.88  The advisory jury was de-
veloped to permit a court in equity to have its “conscience enlight-
ened.”89  It can do this by providing community input with points of
85. Cf. Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation,
and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1996) (describing similar problems in mass tort class actions).
86. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976).  An economist would call these effects externalities.
87. WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 48.
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 29(c), 39(c)(1).
89. Vosburg Co. v. Watts, 221 F. 402, 408 (4th Cir. 1915) (stating “to have its ‘conscience
enlightened’ as the phrase has it, or its work facilitated by referring to a jury some question of
fact which is incidental and subordinate to the main contention”).  Today, an advisory jury may
decide any issue of fact, but that decision is not binding upon the judge, who must make his own
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view different from members of the judicial branch.  An advisory jury
can also increase  sociological legitimacy by putting the imprimatur of
the community on the judicial decision, and appointing an advisory
jury recognizes the importance of a legal issue to the larger commu-
nity.  Consistent with the thesis that participation can be understood
as a form of public reason, a jury trial promotes deliberation.90  This
deliberation is not limited to the “black box” of the jury room.  A jury
trial, like a bench trial, is a public event in which lawyers present
proofs and make arguments to convince the jury that the facts and law
are on their side.  But the presence of jurors adds a different quality to
the determination of a just outcome than a judge acting alone because
it includes different points of view.
Judge Weinstein has recognized the importance of including points
of view outside the judge’s experience and has advocated for the use
of advisory juries in sentencing to “bridge the lifestyle and empathy
gap between judge and criminal” and to provide “insights and the op-
portunity for a more humane and effective administration of jus-
tice.”91  His views are consistent with the insights of cultural cognition
theory: people with different experiences and points of view may see
different narratives in the same facts.92  The jury does more than in-
ject different points of view into the judicial branch, however.  It
forces judges to grapple with these differences.  This is especially true
in the case of the advisory jury, because a judge who has empanelled
one is not permitted to rest on the jury’s decision but must provide her
own findings of fact and legal reasons.
Other judges have pointed out how the advisory jury can provide
sociological legitimacy in legal decision making, or at least greater ac-
ceptance when particularly contentious issues are at stake.  Before the
trial on the New York City police department’s stop-and-frisk prac-
tices—a case seeking injunctive relief and therefore not subject  to the
Seventh Amendment—Judge Shira Scheindlin suggested that a bench
determination, nor the appellate court, which will use the same standard of review as for a bench
trial.  DeFelice v. American Int’l Life Assurance Co. of N.Y., 112 F.3d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1997); see
also FED R. CIV. P. 52(a)(1) (requiring a court to find facts and specifically state its conclusion
when an action is tried to an advisory jury).
90. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 577 (2008)
(“Holding public trials and allowing juries to determine outcomes constitutes a deliberative pro-
cess in which reasoned arguments are presented to citizens who participate in decisionmaking.”);
see also Alexandra D. Lahav, The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3193, 3204–05 (2013).
91. United States v. Kahn, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 220 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
92. See Dan Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going To Believe? Scott v. Harris and the
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV 837, 852–53 (2009) (describing the idea of
cultural cognition in the context of judicial decision making).
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trial was “not the preferable route, because whatever the outcome,
the criticism will be, ‘This is one person.’”93  Her ruling, she ex-
plained, might be attacked as “not a verdict of the community.”94  It
was “important to hear from the community” which, unlike the judge,
could provide “many points of view.”95  These statements could be
understood to express a concern that the judge’s rulings—for which-
ever side—will be perceived as expressions of her own political prefer-
ences rather than of sound legal reasoning.
Challenges to the relative autonomy of law from politics are also
challenges to the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary.  Including
the community in the decision making process and shoring up the
public end of the public reason that leads to the decision can perhaps
mitigate these challenges or reduce their force.  But the very legal
questions at the core of the lawsuit—whether the stop-and-frisk policy
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and whether the policy
violated equal protection of the laws—are questions that are not fully
answerable by expert knowledge and thus legitimately raise the ques-
tion of who decides.96
In a series of cases brought by private groups and the City of New
York against gun manufacturers, Judge Weinstein discussed the use of
an advisory jury.  In the first lawsuit, the NAACP sued gun manufac-
turers on a public nuisance theory.97  Judge Weinstein held that an
advisory jury was appropriate even if the request for injunctive relief
meant that there was no Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial be-
cause the question in the case involved community standards.98  Sev-
eral years later, the City of New York sued a number of gun
manufacturers, also on a public nuisance theory.99  The defendants
93. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Without Jury, Judge Warned That Stop-and-Frisk
Ruling Would Be Disputed, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2014, at A15.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See Akhil Reed Amar, An Unreasonable View of the 4th Amendment, L.A. TIMES (Apr.
29, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001.apr/29/opinion/op-57091 (stating that “[t]he landmark
English search-and-seizure cases that inspired the framers were themselves civil-damage suits
where juries helped determine whether government officials had acted reasonably” and arguing
that the text of the Fourth Amendment, read in conjunction with that of the Seventh Amend-
ment, promises that the people should interpret the scope of the right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizures).
97. NAACP v. Acusport Corp., 226 F. Supp. 2d 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
98. “It is appropriate to take into consideration the values and standards of the community
through the use of an advisory jury in determining whether the conduct of the defendant gun
manufacturers and distributors illegally endangers the public health, safety, and peace.” Id. at
400.
99. City of New York v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 317 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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moved to strike the City’s demand for a jury.100  In holding that an
advisory jury was appropriate, Judge Weinstein explained:
Here, one of the world’s great cities is challenging the international
handgun industry’s practices that are alleged to put at unnecessary
risk millions of urban residents.  The precedential value and impact
of such a case is likely to be substantial.  A jury is likely to enhance
the sense of parties and public that justice has been served—provid-
ing the litigation with greater moral as well as legal force.  No sug-
gestion has been offered that a jury representative of the citizens of
this district would be unqualified to fairly try the issues.101
Why would a jury increase the public perception that justice has been
served?  First, an advisory jury is a protection against accusations of
judicial overreaching or politicization.  But this argument is insuffi-
cient because it makes the advisory jury a fig leaf.  Another way of
thinking about the question is to consider what arguments and delib-
erations are involved in a jury trial that differ from a bench trial.
There are many similarities between the two, but one difference is
that in a jury trial the lawyers and the judge are forced to explain the
law and present the facts in a way that ordinary citizens can under-
stand.  Furthermore, the jury represents a concrete expression that in
cases affecting a topic of with a significant public interest compo-
nent—cases in which the law-declaration function of the courts is par-
ticularly important—the community is a part of the dialogue, and in
convening an advisory jury, the judge recognizes the public import the
underlying social realities that gave rise to a lawsuit and the outcome
to the community.
The two procedural innovations described above as expressions of
public reason—the quasi class action and the advisory jury—present
opposite poles of judicial power.  The quasi class action is a doctrine
that allows judges to involve themselves in what are formally individ-
ual settlements because the judges recognize that the aggregate nature
of the settlements presents risks to the administration of justice and to
the deterrence function of the substantive law.  The advisory jury, by
contrast, injects the community into the adjudicatory process.  The
quasi class action empowers judges and the advisory jury empowers
the community.  Yet both share the common thread of being expres-
sions of the ideal of public reason because both encourage public de-
liberation.  In the quasi class action, an apparently private
attorney–client relationship is recognized as having a significant im-
pact on the public interest, which requires careful scrutiny and a pub-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 196.
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lic airing of arguments.  Similarly, by impanelling an advisory jury, the
court recognizes the importance of providing a rationale for legal de-
cisions that the community and the public can understand and accept.
V. CONCLUSION
The judiciary is a distinctive institution because of its role “in pro-
tecting the respect and dignity due to those before it.”102  Judge Wein-
stein has described his courtroom in the following terms:
Judge, staff, and court personnel treat every person with dignity,
listening respectfully and being as helpful as possible. Everyone
who wishes to be heard—whether as a party, an amicus, stake-
holder, victim, or someone indirectly affected—receives a hearing
on the record.103
The emphasis on individual dignity before the court has been tradi-
tionally understood to mean that each person is entitled her “day in
court.”  Waiver of that right by consent is rooted in an autonomy ra-
tionale and supported by a view of the courts as institutions commit-
ted to private dispute resolution.  But the day in court ideal can also
be understood as an expression of and a commitment to an ideal of
public reason because the courts are enforcers and articulators of the
law.  The public reason approach to the right to be heard does not
require individual participation, and for this reason, it is a worthwhile
way to think about participation in mass litigation.
The public reason rationale for participation requires procedures
that set up a robust dialogue, just as the consent rationale requires
procedures that assure knowing consent.  Under a consent rational for
participation in litigation, the concern is that in aggregate settlements
litigation ceases to be an expression of individual autonomy.  Under
the public reason rationale, the problem with aggregate litigation and
other features of the modern litigation landscape is that the structure
of the system suppresses the presentation of proofs and arguments on
both sides.  Suppressing the presentation of proofs, arguments, and
reasoned decision making diminishes an institution that ought to pro-
vide public reason, the basis for self-government in a deliberative
democracy.
102. United States v. Kahn, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
103. Jack B. Weinstein, The Roles of a Federal District Court Judge, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 439,
439 (2011).
